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GORBACHEV’S
Pacific
GAMBIT
Late last year Gorbachev made the West another offer: 
the closure o f the USSR’s only Pacific base in return for 
the US bases in the Philippines. It was received in 
silence. Kevin Rowley explains why.
I n his speech at Krasnoyarsk in September last year, Mikhail Gorbachev offered to abandon 
Soviet facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in 
Vietnam if the United States agreed 
to eliminate its military bases in the 
Philippines. Over the last decade, 
American officials have again and 
again pointed to Cam Ranh as the 
cutting edge of Soviet expansion in 
the Asian-Pacific region. Yet the US 
dismissed Gorbachev’s offer, as one 
press report put it, “at first glance” .
In fact, this response should 
surprise no one. Gorbachev first 
floated the idea in his Vladivostok 
speech in July 1986, as part of a 
broader proposal to demilitarise 
great-power relations in Asia. That 
was not welcomed by the US. One of 
Reagan’s advisers responded by 
warning that the Soviets were 
backing military initiatives with 
“subtle diplomatic tactics”, and 
expressed confidence that  the 
countries of the region would judge 
America’s “solid record” more 
f a v o u r a b l y  t h a n  G o rb a c h e v ’s 
“ s w e e p i n g  s u g g e s t i o n s  o f
‘confidence-building measures’ ”.
Americans like to think of 
t hemse l ves  as o p p o n e n t s  o f 
colonialism. Yet the US launched 
its career as a great power in Asia 
with a classical act of colonialism — 
the military occupation of the 
Philippines during the Spanish- 
American War (1898-1902). It was 
then that the US Navy moved into 
Subic Bay. And what is now Clark 
Air Base began as a colonial outpost 
of the US Cavalry in 1902.
However, these bases did not 
assume their present importance in 
US strategic thinking until World 
War II. In the wake of Pearl 
Harbour, the American government 
decided on permanent deployment of 
US naval and air forces to the 
western Pacific and East Asia after 
the war. This would provide 
“security in depth” for the US itself, 
and a shield for American trade and 
communication routes throughout 
the Asian-Pacific region. When 
World War II ended, the US had 
secured a network of bases from 
Hawaii across to the Philippines, 
north to Japan itself, then through 
the Aleutians to Alaska.
This, it should be noted, 
occurred before the onset of the Cold 
War. The massive US military 
presence in the Philippines is the 
legacy of the globalisation of US 
interests in the first half of the 
Twentieth Century and of the 
resulting commercial and military 
rivalry with European colonialism 
and Japanese imperialism. It was not 
a response to Soviet “expansionism"
The US ended its colonial rule in 
the Philippines after World War II 
But in 1947 the new government 
signed an agreement giving the US a 
99-year lease on Clark and Subic, 
amended to a 25-year lease in 1966.
These are now huge facilities. The 
naval base at Subic Bay covers
55.000 acres of water and land. Clark 
Air Base once encompassed 130,000 
acres (larger than Washington DC); 
since 1979 it has been reduced to a 
more modest 25,000 acres. There are
6.000 Americans stationed at Subic, 
and more than 9,000 at Clark. In 
addition, the American military 
directly employs about 45,000 
Filipinos.
An important part of the 
Reagan administration’s drive to
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-
build up American military might 
has been a renewed emphasis on the 
importance of sea-power. As a naval
- commander explained:
... sea transport is the basis on which the 
United States conducts commerce and 
exerts military influence globally. Raw 
materials and finished goods must move 
to and from this continent to sustain the 
[ US economy. Military force and its 
support must be deliverable in all seas 
and to distant lands to protect vital 
"* national interests ... Why do we need a 
.navy? Because only a navy can protect 
sea transport and project national power 
world-wide ... Loss of the ability to move 
safely on the seas is loss of global power.
In 1986 Gaston Sigur, Jr, 
ft, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asia and the Pacific, explained that 
the Philippine bases were central to 
the US “ stra tegy  of forw ard  
deployment in Asia”. They “provide 
a secure foundation which makes 
possible the pursuit of our larger 
political and economic interests in 
this key part of the globe”. In 
a d d i t i o n  - to p r o t e c t i n g  the  
Philippines, he said, the bases
- “ s u p p o r t  ■ o u r  w i d e - r a n g i n g  
commitments all along the Asian 
littoral” from Korea to the Persian 
Gulf, and secure the “vital South
China sea-lanes against the ever- 
increasing Soviet threat”.
For forty years, nationalists and 
leftists in the Philippines have viewed 
the bases as symbols of foreign 
domination. That view has recently 
begun to command wide support 
among the public, and within the 
Aquino government. The Americans 
were unpleasantly surprised by the 
tough stance taken by the Philippine 
Foreign Secretary, Raul Manglapus, 
in the review of the base-agreement 
that began in April last year.
The US presently pays the 
Philippines US$180 million a year 
for the use of the bases. Manila 
points out that Washington pays 
US$2 billion a year for its bases in 
Egypt and Israel, and complains that 
the Philippines is being short­
changed. Manglapus began with 
demands of an annual payment of 
$US1.2 billion, declaring that the 
Americans should “pay up or move 
out”. He added: “If Filipinos want to 
grow they have to slay the American 
father image.”
US officials, struggling with 
yawning budget and trade deficits, 
and convinced that their allies 
(including the Philippines) have been 
enjoying a “free ride” on defence
expenditures, responded angrily. 
“This isn’t a real estate deal,” 
c o m p l a i n e d  N i c h o l a s  P l a t t ,  
Ambassador to the Philippines. 
Then Secretary of State George 
Shultz declared: “There are those in 
the Philippines who think they have a 
great asset and should rent it out for a 
staggering sum. If that’s their view 
we’ll have to find some other place.”
By October the two sides had 
struck a bargain. The Americans 
agreed to increase their annual 
payments to $US481 million. They 
also agreed to consider “creative” 
debt restructuring to help the 
Philippines overcome the disastrous 
legacy of the Marcos years; but the 
existing base agreement expires in
1991. So bitter were the exchanges 
between US and Philippine officials 
during the latest review that the idea 
that it will not be renewed is now 
taken quite seriously. That would 
mean the phasing out of the 
American presence in the Philippines 
within five to ten years — regardless 
of what Gorbachev does about Cam 
RanlBay.
Cam Ranh rivals Subic as one of 
the great natural harbours of the Far 
East. It has long attracted the 
attention of naval commanders. The 
French first visited it in 1847 but, 
when they quit Indochina in the mid- 
1950s, they left only a handful of 
rotting barracks behind at Cam 
Ranh.
The development of major 
facilities there was the product of 
American intervention in Vietnam. 
Cam Ranh became the site of what 
US News and World Report 
described as “the largest overseas 
project undertaken since World War 
11 ”. The U S constructed a deep-water 
seaport with five piers, and a 10,000- 
ft concrete airfield. 25,000 American 
and South Korean troops were 
stationed there. This was the 
American answer to the problems of 
“finding ways and means of feeding, 
clothing, housing, arming, supplying 
and resupplying the pow erful 
military machine the US is installing 
in Southeast Asia, 11,000 miles from 
its home base”.
The Americans had no doubts 
that they would win the war in 
Veitnam. (Showing a reporter
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around Cam Ranh, an officer 
proudly declared: “This is the way 
we’ve won allour wars — being in the 
right place at the right time with the 
mostest.”) Thus they thought Cam 
Ranh might be “only the beginning":
Looking into the future, some military 
planners foresee the possibility of Cam 
Ranh becoming another vital link in the 
US defence chain facing Red China ... 
Clearly the US military complex on the 
Vietnamese coast is going to be bigger 
than anything the Americans have in 
Korea. It is impossible to say at this point 
how big the installation will be eventually' 
... Plans change daily — always up.
But the Vietnamese communist 
victory in 1975 put paid to such ideas, 
and in 1976 the Americans also had 
to abandon the bases they had built 
in T h ailan d  dur ing the war. 
American forces were retrenched to 
the off-shore island chain, above all, 
the bases in the Philippines, while 
Vietnam’s Soviet allies pondered 
whether Cam Ranh might now be 
useful to them.
Leonid Brezhnev believed in 
security through strength. His 
generation of Soviet leaders had been 
seared by the Nazi invasion in 1941, 
and in 1962 he observed how John F. 
Kennedy had used US military 
s u p e r i o r i t y  to f o r ce  Ni k i t a  
Khrushchev into a humiliating 
retreat during the Cuban missile 
crisis. After he replaced Khrushchev 
as general secretary of the CPSU in 
1964, Brezhnev presided over a 
military build-up aimed at achieving 
military parity with the US. What 
Brezhnev wanted above all was to 
force the Americans to treat the 
Soviet Union as an equal. He saw no 
contradiction between this and 
negotiations aimed at detente and 
strategic arms limitation.
One of the great beneficiaries of 
security  t hrough streng th  was 
A d m i r a l  S e r g e i  G o r s h k o v ,  
commander of the Soviet navy. 
When the US navy developed the 
capability of launching nuclear 
attacks on the Soviet Union from 
submarines and aircraft carriers, he 
persuaded Brezhnev that the only 
way to counter this was for the Soviet 
navy to develop a blue-water 
capability. The reach of the Soviet 
navy, previously limited to coastal
defence, would be greatly extended 
Yet the aim was still basically 
defensive. As an Israeli writer on 
strategic issues noted recently in The 
Australian: “According to most 
Western analysts, the Soviet navy’s 
primary strategic wartime mission is 
to deny the US and NATO access to 
maritime regions close to the USSR 
that might be useds for offensive 
operations against Soviet missile- 
launching submarine bastions of the 
Soviet homeland.”
As the Americans well know, a 
navy with the global reach to which 
Gorshkov aspired needs access to 
ports and supply-points far from its 
home bases. For the Soviet Pacific 
Fleet, based in Vladivostok, Cam 
Ranh Bay must have looked an 
in teresting  p ro p o sitio n . Soviet 
officials inspected it shortly before 
the Vietnamese communist victory in 
1975. They reportedly asked for use 
of the facilities there, but were 
refused by Hanoi, keen to avoid a 
hostile response from Washington 
and Beijing.
That consideration had become 
redundant by 1978. China had 
adopted a hostile policy; Washington 
sided with Beijing and refused to 
establish relations with Vietnam. 
Hanoi responded by throwing its lot 
in with Moscow. Even so, Soviet 
access to Cam Ranh came only after 
the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in 
February 1979.
Soviet use of the facilities at 
Cam Ranh grew slowly but steadily. 
In 1979 there were only two broken- 
down piers left at Cam Ranh. By 
1985 the Soviets had added five 
floating piers and a floating dock, 
and a fuel-storage tank. Soviet 
submarines and warships were using 
these facilities regularly.
The US-built airfield was also 
brought  back into operat ion.  
Eventually , fourteen  TU -95Ds 
(Bears” in NATO parlance) and 
the same number of MIG-23s 
■(“ F l o g g e r s ” ) a n d  T U - 1 6 s  
(“Badgers”) were deployed at Cam 
Ranh. The “Bears” are long-range 
reconnaissance aircraft, designed in 
the middle-1950s, though the variant 
deployed at Cam Ranh dates from 
the mid-1960s. The “Floggers” used 
to be the standard Warsaw Pact air-
to-air fighters, but are currently 
being phased out in favour of M IG - 
25s. The “Badgers” are long-range 
attack aircraft which can carry 
bombs or anti-ship missiles (with 
either conventional or nuclear 
warheads). They are of early 1950s 
vintage.
In addition, the Soviets had 
established a radio-communications 
cent re  at  Cam Ranh .  This 
presumably not only enabled Soviet 
forces there to communicate with 
their home-base at Vladivostok, but 
also to listen to US communications 
with their bases in the Philippines. 
This may also have provided Hanoi 
with valuable signals — intelligence 
on Chinese operations on the Sino- 
V i e t n a m e s e  b o r d e r  a n d  in 
Kampuchea.
US officials insisted that this 
amounted to a permanent, fully- 
operational Soviet military base. In 
reporting Gorbachev’s Krasnoyarsk 
speech,  the Aus t r a l i an  press 
invariably followed suit, describing 
Cam Ranh as a “base” although 
Gorbachev referred only to a 
“supply-point”.
When I was in Hanoi last year 1 
asked General Tran Cong Man, 
editor of the Vietnamese army 
newspaper, whether Cam Ranh was 
a “base”. He said it was not. It was 
simply a point of supply and 
replenishment for the Soviet Pacific 
Fleet:
Soviet ships come to get goods, such as 
fresh water, oil and petrol. But Cam 
Ranh Bay is the territory of Vietnam — 
we would never sell it to another country. 
This is completely different to the US 
bases in the Philippines, where weapons 
(including nuclear weapons) are stored.
In the most thorough western study 
of the question to date, Buszynski 
essentially concurred with General 
M an’s view:
The Soviet Union has not yet acquired a 
base in Cam Ranh Bay ... The Soviet 
reliance on floating docks and limited 
installations demonstrates a reluctance 
to make a permanent commitment and 
an avoidance of major investments which 
shows that the Soviet build-up at Cam 
Ranh Bay has been restricted and 
controlled ...
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When the Soviets first moved 
into Cam Ranh, many American 
observers had no doubts about their 
purpose. A Business Week writer, 
for example, declared that the 
Soviets were aiming at “the most 
traditional kinds of naval power” 
and strove to acquire bases and 
facilities “all over the world”. From 
the “crucially important installation” 
at Cam Ranh they were able to 
threaten “one of the most travelled 
shipping routes in the world”, that 
between the Middle East and Japan.
This fitted the Cold War 
rhetoric of the time, but it was never a 
persuasive argument. In time of war, 
the Soviets would have their hands 
full seeking to protect the Soviet 
homeland from nuclear attack; in 
time of peace, they themselves wish 
to use these shipping routes without
Gorbachev’s speech reflects an 
important shift in Soviet 
thinking.
disruption. The most thorough 
assessment of this point by a US 
military analyst (as distinct from 
propagandist) concluded that the 
Soviet presence at Cam Ranh “is 
unlikely to have a specific, aggressive 
regional intent, since that would be 
quite out of character for a power 
that, at least until now, has revealed 
itself as ... cautious and non-
confrontational”.
The Soviets have not made the 
investments needed to defend Cam 
Ranh against a major attack by 
American forces, let alone to use it 
for offensive purposes. As we have 
seen, the planes they have sent there 
are antiquated. As Kim Beazley, the 
Australian Defence Minister, has 
remarked. Cam Ranh would not 
survive day one of a military
confrontation between the super­
powers.
Cam Ranh is useful to the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet in more mundane ways. 
By providing repair and refuelling 
facilities, it has extended the
operating time of vessels on missions 
tar from Vladivostok. In particular, 
this has given the Soviets the 
capability of a greater presence in the
Indian Ocean, where there has been a 
substantial US naval build-up since 
the fall of the Shah, the Gulf War, 
an d  So v i e t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in 
Afghanistan. Interestingly, however, 
the Soviets have made no real 
attempt to match the US build-up in 
the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the 
number of patrols they have carried 
out in those waters has reportedly 
declined markedly since the early 
1980s.
Cam Ranh also enables the 
Soviets to make air-reconnaissance 
missions in the South China Seas, 
and probably to eavesdrop on both 
American and Chinese military 
communications. This was probably 
of much greater importance a decade 
ago, when international relations in 
the region were deteriorating rapidly, 
than it is now.
While Cam Ranh is clearly 
useful to the Soviet navy, it is hardly 
comparable to the US facilities at 
Clark and Subic. Gorbachev’s 
Krasnoyarsk speech has compelled 
the Cold Warriors to do an abrupt 
about-turn: rather than exaggerating 
Cam Ranh's significance, they now 
seek to emphasise how unimportant 
it really is. Their point now, of 
course, is to show that mutual 
disengagement is unfair to the US.
Gorbachev’s offer was dismissed 
by US officials as “largely a 
propagandist effort designed to 
embarrass us as we go through our 
Philippines bases review” No 
doubt, such considerations were in 
Gorbachev’s mind. As such, the 
Krasnoyarsk speech was a highly 
successful exercise. US officials were 
suitably embarrassed.
But there was more to the 
matter than cynical point-scoring. 
Gorbachev’s speech reflects an 
important shift in Soviet strategic 
thinking. By the early 1980s, 
Brezhnev’s policy of security through 
strength was in tatters. The drive for 
parity with the US had alarmed less 
powerful nations (of which China 
was: the most important), and helped 
provoke a new US military build-up 
aimed at res tor ing A m erican 
supremacy. Detente and arms- 
control talks collapsed. However, the 
best response Brezhnev could come 
up with was to assert that peace
would not be defended by begging, 
and to promise to match the 
American effort. It was an approach 
which was proving h ideously  
expensive, at a time when the 
performance of the Soviet economy 
was deteriorating.
Gorbachev is a member of the 
po st-w ar g enera tion  in Soviet 
politics. He has been critical of the 
over-emphasis placed on the need for 
military strength by Brezhnev’s 
generation, and is seeking to cut 
military spending. Among those who 
retired after Gorbachev took over 
was Admi r a l  Gor s h k o v .  His 
su cc esso r. Ad mi r a l  Vl ad i mi r  
Chenavin, has reportedly come 
under strong pressure to cut ship­
building programs initiated by 
Gorshkov.
Soviet military experts have 
recently been instructed to rethink 
received doctrines which engender 
i nsecur i t y  a m o n g  o t her s  by 
emphasising attack as the best form 
of defence. Gorbachev has been 
seeking to de-emphasise the whole 
military dimension of great power 
relations generally, and to emphasise 
diplomacy and mutuality of interest. 
But for this to succeed, he needs to 
provoke a similar re-evaluation in 
the US.
It is unlikely that Gorbachev 
expected the Americans to respond 
positively to his Krasnoyarsk speech. 
He was aiming to convince the 
Chinese and Southeast Asian nations 
that he is genuine in his commitment 
to  demi l i t a r i s i ng  g r e a t - p o we r  
relations in the Far East, and that the 
chief obstacle to further progress is 
the  Amer i c an  side.  F o r the 
fundamental challenge to America’s 
strategic position in the Asian- 
Pacific region has not come from the 
“ever-expanding Soviet threat” of 
which Gaston Sigur speaks. It has 
come from the growth of indigenous 
nationalism and the development of 
the industrial and military power of 
countries such as China, India and 
Japan. It is the dynamism of the 
whole region which is fast bringing 
to a close the era when Far Eastern 
waters were an "American Lake”.
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